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This paper has as its starting point calls for critical management studies (CMS) to engage more actively 
with the public. CMS has been relatively successful in gaining an institutional foothold within university 
business schools, but is criticised from within for a lack of influence outside the institution. We argue that 
while closer relationships with the public is assumed to be the next phase in the institutional development 
of CMS, strengthening its position within university business schools is likely only to exacerbate the 
present lack of public engagement, since this becomes an end in itself. Bigger and better conferences and 
a proliferation of journals dedicated to the publishing of CMS research takes us further from the everyday 
world of workplace politics. As part of creating a space in which we can think differently about CMS and 
the university, we draw on Foucault’s analysis of parrhesia, or fearless speech, which emphasises 
critique as a personal quality. 
abstract 
Introduction 
We approach this topic from two quite different places. We share a passion for the 
critique of management and organization but we pursue different strategies in practising 
this critique. One of us represents a CMS1 ‘insider’, whose efforts have, in some small 
way, helped to strengthen the institutional foundations of CMS – by writing research 
articles, organising conferences activities and introducing critical management 
education in his classroom. The other is more an ‘outsider’ to CMS, who does not 
attend the conferences or write much for the journals, but instead works with activists 
and writes for a wider public. This paper represents something of a compromise – a 
paper in an academic journal on the subject of critique and CMS’ political engagement 
with the public. 
The university is in crises over its crises. The university is unsure of even its crises, like 
the skeptic who is unsure of their agnosticism. But the university runs on, powered by 
all those things that make the world go around. For Readings (1996), the university is in 
a state of destruction. If we are to sift through the ruins of the university what would we 
seek to salvage? For us, it would be ‘critique’. Our starting point is Kant, in whom we 
__________ 
 The authors would like to thank Armin Beverungen, the rest of the ephemera collective and two 
anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on this paper. 
1 We use this cautiously, in the knowledge that it is a contested term, both in terms of what it stands for 
and whom it includes. 
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see not so much the architect of the modern university as the one who helped lay its 
foundation. 
We are sympathetic to Kant’s articulation of the university as the site of the 
institutionalization of critique and of reason, given the extension of sovereign power 
and censorship which he faced at the time of his writing two centuries ago. We are also 
cognisant of the influence of his thinking on the development of the university since 
that time. Kant’s impassioned plea for the protection of freedom of expression within 
the university has its legacy in conceptions of academic freedom and the university as a 
critic of society. Those who fight for the preservation of such privileges – and we have 
done this at various times ourselves – do so with the best of intentions. Unfortunately, a 
potential side-effect of institutionalizing critique within the university is that academics 
become removed from the very locations which their critique concerns – be it the 
workplace, the hospital, parliament or wherever. We see this as a problem, and we are 
not the only ones. Within CMS, it is the subject of countless conference streams, papers, 
committee meetings and conversations, typically expressed as ‘how can CMS engage 
more actively with the public?’ 
To address this ‘problem’ we turn to Foucault. There is a growing interest in the 
deployment of Foucault’s later works in organization studies (Chan and Garrick, 2002; 
Jack, 2004; Starkey and Hatchuel, 2002; Wray-Bliss, 2004). Here, Foucault’s attention 
is directed towards the possibilities for transformation through the reinvigoration of 
critical thinking and the reinvention of the political, together with an analysis of its 
limitations and constraints. This later work can be seen as Foucault recanting on or 
mitigating the effects of his earlier work which was seen to delimit the space for 
individual action through a conception of power which challenged the notion of an 
autonomous, sovereign individual. 
Our focus here is his analysis of parrhesia, which, although not written as a blueprint for 
intellectual practice, does provide us with alternative ways of thinking about the 
relationship between critical management scholars and the people. It calls upon us to 
recognize critique more as a personal quality than as an institutional right and urges us 
to engage with not just our students and academic colleagues, but with the targets of our 
critique. 
A Problem for Critical Management Studies 
The success of CMS is well documented by Adler et al. (2008), including a thriving 
group of the Academy of Management which has now achieved division status, a large 
biannual conference in the UK and regional groupings of scholars around the world. 
Despite these successes, there is also a level of questioning and concern about its future 
direction, particularly with regard to the form, content and extent of communication 
with a wider public. Grey and Sinclair (2006: 445), for instance, criticise CMS for 
writing that it “is too often pretentious, obscurantist and dull”. The effect of such 
writing is to render it meaningless to anyone outside CMS, thereby making it politically 
useless, in the sense of having any impact on the world of practice. 
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CMS might appear to provide an ideal home for academics keen to take on activist 
roles. The domain statement for the Academy of Management’s CMS division lists the 
ambitious goal of “the creation of better organizations, more humane societies, and a 
viable world system” (CMS Division, 2008). However, critical management scholars 
are routinely and vigorously criticised for their efforts in the public arena, often by 
those sympathetic to the CMS agenda. Böhm and Spoelstra (2004: 98) ask: “has the 
CMS project even come close to starting to have a real impact in the academy and wider 
spheres of society?” Their answer: “a clear No”.  
These observations about a lack of external engagement will come as no surprise to 
those who have attended CMS conferences, where this is a recurring topic of 
discussion. Perhaps more surprising is that even in academic publications, critical 
management scholars are neglecting the issues that are supposedly of concern to them. 
Dunne et al.’s (2008) analysis of articles published in top business and management 
journals found that little attention is paid to political issues such as war, exploitation or 
international migration. While one might expect critically-oriented journals to buck the 
trend the results were underwhelming, leading the authors to conclude that 
“management academics want to claim power, but not responsibility” (ibid.: 276). 
Do we expect too much from CMS? Is it reasonable to expect more from critical 
management studies than the critical study of management, disseminated amongst 
academic colleagues through seminars, conferences, books and journals? Certainly, 
central figures in CMS believe that is not too much to ask. In their overview of CMS for 
the Academy of Management Annals, Adler et al. (2008: 156-157) conclude that: 
Those committed to advancing critical studies of management will doubtless continue to refine 
their theories and to debate the merits of their different approaches; the bigger challenge, however, 
and the one that provides the warrant for this internal debate, is to contribute more forcefully to 
shaping public agendas. 
This, then, is a problem for CMS. The voice of CMS grows louder in its location of the 
university business school, but remains almost inaudible to those outside. In this paper 
we argue that while we too would wish to see critical management scholars engaging 
more vigorously with the politics of the workplace, we see CMS more as the reason for 
a lack of engagement than the vehicle for the realization of this goal. In making our case 
we turn to Kant’s argument for the university as the site for the institutionalization of 
critique and consider what it means in the university we inhabit today. 
The Institutionalization of Critique and its Consequences 
Kant (2007) answers the question of ‘What is enlightenment?’ using the motto ‘Sapere 
Aude’ or ‘Dare to know!’ It is, he argues, a comfortable existence to take direction from 
others and there are always authority figures ready and willing to direct. In the age of 
enlightenment, however, people have the courage to free themselves from tutelage and 
“the freedom to make public one’s use of reason at every point” (2007: 31). In Conflict 
of the Faculties (1992), Kant articulates a distinctive role for the university as the 
institutional location for the progressive use of reason. The ‘lower’ faculty of 
philosophy acts in the name of reason to oversee the more practical ‘higher’ faculties of 
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medicine, theology and law, which teach practitioners in line with government-
approved doctrine. The lower faculty analyses these teachings and instigates conflicts 
aimed at keeping them aligned with reason and away from dogma. Upholding the 
freedom of expression of the lower faculty is in the interests not just of the government, 
but of the higher faculties themselves, since only then can their teaching be aligned with 
reason. Kant proposes, therefore, a strict division of labour within the university: the 
higher faculties, whose teachings interest the government and which they can sanction; 
and the lower faculty, which pursues the interests of science based on reason (Kant, 
1992). 
Kant’s locating of critique in the institute of the university needs to be understood 
within the context of censorship in which he wrote Conflict of the Faculties. Frederick 
the Great ruled with the dictum ‘argue all you will, but obey’, which at least allowed for 
free discussion through which Kant believed reason would triumph. The limits of 
arguing were cut short under Frederick William II who imposed an edict which 
censored all writing that strayed too far from religious doctrine. Kant ran foul of the 
censorship commission with Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason and starts 
Conflict of the Faculties with the letter he received from Minister of Justice Woellner, 
which accuses him of using philosophy to denigrate the scriptures. Woellner urges Kant 
to discharge his duty to the State – “failing this, you must expect unpleasant measures 
for your continuing obstinacy” (ibid.: 11). 
In this hostile environment, Conflict of the Faculties can be read simultaneously as an 
assertion of the rights of philosophers to speak out and a reassurance that such activity 
will not threaten the sovereign. To make the case, Kant invokes a distinction between 
the people and the learned community of scholars. Kant (1992: 15) denies that in 
Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason he has offended the State, since “the book in 
question is not suitable for the public: to them it is an unintelligible, closed book, only a 
debate among scholars of the faculty, of which the people take no notice.” 
While Kant talks often of the public and of the philosophy faculty as having the 
responsibility for publicly presenting truth, the definition of public is narrow. The 
higher faculties must answer to the government because their teachings “circulate 
among the people as a civil community” (ibid.: 57, emphasis in original), whereas the 
scholarly debates of the lower faculties “are directed to a different kind of public – a 
learned community” to which “the people are resigned to understanding nothing about” 
(ibid.).  
The legacy of Kant continues in many universities of the present, where the freedom of 
expression is not just the preserve of the philosophy department, but is generalised 
across all faculties. In New Zealand, for instance, under the Education Act (1989), 
universities are required, amongst other things, to accept a role as critic and conscience 
of society. The critic and conscience role extends to state-funded polytechnics and 
colleges of education (which specialise in the training of teachers) but not to private 
educational providers. These critic and conscience responsibilities, in turn, rely on the 
protection of academic freedom, defined as “the freedom of academic staff and students 
to question and test received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and to state 
controversial or unpopular opinions” (Education Act, 1989).  
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The formal assignment of the role of critique to universities and the legal protection of 
this through academic freedom offers comfort for those who assert the university’s role 
in a democratic society as an independent source of social criticism (Tasker and 
Packham, 1990). There are, however, reasons to be concerned about its manifestations 
in our commercialised, professionalised universities of the early twenty-first century. 
We will deal briefly with three: the ‘misuse’ of academic freedom; a narrowing of the 
definition of what constitutes critique; and a reluctance to view critique as a personal 
ethic. We then suggest that Foucault’s analysis of parrhesia might offer us a way of 
addressing these consequences. 
A perceived lack of engagement with the people is a critique that extends beyond CMS 
to business schools as a whole. There is no shortage of intellectuals conducting research 
in universities and no shortage of public commentators offering an opinion of the major 
issues of the day. However, there are very few public intellectuals – academics who 
write for a non-specialist audience on matters of public interest. Business and 
management is deeply implicated in major issues of public debate (e.g. climate change, 
globalisation and public ethics), yet business school academics are conspicuously 
absent from the public sphere. In the past, universities have been a central institution 
providing these public intellectuals. Yet increasingly think tanks, consultants, 
journalists and the proliferating ‘blogosphere’ have supplanted them, with academics 
blamed for retreating into a private and self-referential world of specialist publications 
and arcane debates. Jacoby (1987) is critical of academics for accepting the security 
offered by the profession and neglecting their role of addressing a wider public, arguing 
that academic freedom not only loses its relevance, but is partly to blame for making the 
intellectual’s existence in the university a safe and comfortable one. 
Along with the institutional protections of ‘academic freedom’ come constraints and 
responsibilities which reinforce a tendency towards the proliferation of ‘safe specialists’ 
in universities (Posner, 2001: 6). Academic freedom is personal in the sense of 
permitting freedom of speech within the law, yet it is a freedom only gained through 
membership of the institution, justified on the grounds that is to be exercised by 
academics for the good of society. Typically, academic freedom only extends to some 
activities performed by academics, with a distinction made between speaking as a 
private individual and speaking as an academic or professional expert. Freedom 
becomes linked to the academic’s area of expertise, so if they comment on areas outside 
their expertise they speak as private individuals, not as members of the institution, with 
the University not obliged to defend their right to speak. In theory, there is nothing to 
prevent academics from speaking out on matters of public concern which fall outside 
their expertise. In practice, however, self-censorship can become the norm, with 
academics reluctant to make political interventions in the public sphere because of a 
fear their careers will be inhibited (Bridgman, 2007).  
A related concern is that we rest comfortably in the knowledge that universities will 
safeguard the role of critique because it is their legal obligation. In doing so, we 
abdicate our own sense of ethic or responsibility and leave the task of engaging with the 
public to an organization which faces pressures towards conservatism because of its 
range of competing stakeholder demands. At our university, the ‘critic and conscience’ 
role is one of the university’s strategic goals, with administrators keen to gather data on 
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academics’ interactions in the public sphere. A key issue is what constitutes ‘critique’ 
and given the definition of academic freedom described above, this tends to be 
interpreted narrowly as evidenced-based policy analysis, or similar. There are parallels 
here with Bauman’s (1989: 163) argument that “the organization as a whole is an 
instrument to obliterate responsibility”. The effect of organizations’ attempts to control 
the behaviour of their employees is that individual ethical responsibility is suppressed. 
Applying Bauman’s thinking to business ethics, Wray-Bliss (2007: 520) states that “by 
promoting the idea that management should take responsibility for deciding and 
enforcing ‘ethics’, business ethics can be argued to be further removing ethical 
responsibility from individual organizational members” (emphasis in original). 
If we are dissatisfied with what passes as critique in contemporary universities, what 
then, do we want from critique and from the university? We are not advocating that we 
abandon the institution. By being in the university, whether as a student or member of 
the academic or general staff, we are all committed to the university to some degree. 
Unsurprisingly, we would like to see a university that is less obsessed by debates 
amongst the community of scholars. As Derrida notes, the idea of the Kantian 
university in which faculty speak publicly “but only inside the university” is now 
outdated (2002: 220, emphasis in original). While acknowledging that Kant’s assertion 
of an essence in the form of an absolute free space deserves symbolic protection, 
Derrida believes this must be claimed “not only in a verbal and declarative fashion, but 
in work, in act, and in what we make happen with events” (ibid.). 
Derrida’s (2002) conception of a ‘university without condition’ is an appealing one, 
where there is the “right to say everything” and “the right to say it publicly, to publish 
it” (2002: 205). Derrida’s unconditional university represents a utopia, but it can be 
approached through rigorous deconstruction in which nothing is immune from critique. 
We can think of this as a duty of the university and being part of it therefore requires 
working within the institution to explore its limits, as well as the possibilities of 
escaping them – ‘to be in not of’ the modern university (Moten and Harney, 2004: 102). 
The merits of a deconstruction-based pedagogy for critical management education have 
been explored elsewhere (Dey and Steyaert, 2007). An alternative way forward is to 
turn to Foucault (2007a; 2007b), who, like Derrida (2004), sees a dual role for critique, 
both as an historical analysis of how we come to be constituted as subjects, as well as an 
exploration of the possibilities of moving beyond those limits. This approach is 
reflected in Foucault’s own forays into political debate, where he used historical 
analysis as the foundation for specific interventions on issues such as gender relations, 
authority, and how we conceive of mental illness. While we acknowledge the merits of 
these contributions to a critical pedagogy, our interest here is on Foucault’s analysis of 
parrhesia. Foucault does not connect this explicitly to the position of the intellectual and 
of the university, but it can provide a novel way of considering possibilities for 
countering the effects of institutionalized critique. 
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__________ 
Parrhesia and Its Relevance for CMS 
Parrhesia has gained attention since the last of a series of lectures delivered on the topic 
at University of California, Berkeley and Collège de France by Foucault, in the two 
years prior to his death. Interest in the term gained momentum when Semiotext(e) 
released Fearless Speech (2001), an edited script of the six 1983 Berkeley lectures. In 
classical Greece, parrhesia was an attitude and practice that extended to all spheres of 
life. The parrhesiastic act was singular, and not a vocation, but its speaker was required 
to possess certain characteristics which allowed him to be considered to be speaking the 
truth.2  
It is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his 
life because he recognises truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as 
himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, 
truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead 
of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy… (Foucault, 2001: 19-20) 
The parrhesiastes says everything and hides nothing, using the most direct words 
possible. Parrhesia, as speaking the truth, and rhetoric, as speaking artfully, are held as 
strict opposites. A pre-condition for being able to speak with parrhesia is the coherence 
between ones’ beliefs and actions. The parrhesiastes “says what he knows to be true” 
(ibid.: 14). To speak the truth requires courage but to be considered parrhesia, it is also 
necessary that there is a risk or danger involved. Parrhesia takes place “in a situation 
where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the 
interlocutor”. (ibid.: 18). Finally, the parrhesiastes speaks because he feels it his moral 
duty to do so, rather than because someone forces him to speak. In describing the 
characteristics of the parrhesiastes, Foucault wants to make it clear that “parrhesia is 
usually spoken of as a personal quality, and not as an institutional right” (ibid.: 85).  
The Kynic can be considered as the parrhesiastes par excellence, as the ideal 
emphasised in Boethius’ The Consolation of Philosophy as both the happiest and freest 
man due to his ‘self-sufficiency’. Boethius’ emphasis on the importance of not only 
lacking a master to report to, but also to be without slaves to depend on, catches the 
Kynic attitude to freedom. The most infamous Kynic is Diogenes of Sinope,3 who was 
not a ‘born’ truth teller, but emerged through a number of circumstances from his 
defacing of the currency, through to his surfacing in Athens as a ‘dog philosopher’. The 
Kynic lived in public and engaged in an embodied critique – “the Kynic farts, shits, 
pisses, masturbates on the street, before the eyes of the Athenian market” (Sloterdijk, 
1987: 103). Diogenes’ home was a barrel in the street – he lived not only for the public, 
but of the public. His criticisms were never private challenges but were issued in the 
market, on the street, and in the assembly. Diogenes was able to speak truly in these 
locations as they were public; as a resident of the city they were every bit as much his as 
anyone else’s.  
2 The parrhesiastes was always a ‘he’ since participation in Athenian democracy was not open to 
women. 
3 See Diogenes as the focus in Sloterdijk (1988) and an analysis of the papers in Branham and Goulet-
Cazé (1996).  
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What are the implications of parrhesia for our practice? Teaching would seem to be one 
aspect of our academic lives amenable to the practice of parrhesia. Jack (2004), for 
instance, deploys parrhesia to think about how we engage with students in the 
classroom, “to encourage them to reflect on their own moralities and their own lives” 
(2004: 133). If, however, we apply the criteria of parrhesia strictly, the criterion of 
criticism requires that the speaker be in a position of inferiority with respect to the 
interlocutor. Perhaps we might claim this to be the case where our students are 
managers, but otherwise, it would not seem that we are in a less powerful position than 
our students. While parrhesia could conceivably be part of a critical management 
education (Grey, 2004), approaches such as Derrida’s deconstruction (Dey and Steyaert, 
2007), involving both a critical questioning and an invention of possibilities might have 
greater applicability in the classroom than fearless speech. 
We also question the extent to which it is possible to practise parrhesia with our 
academic colleagues, at conferences for example. Whilst we are probably not alone in 
approaching conference presentations with some trepidation, it is not altogether clear 
who the interlocutor might be or if indeed there is a risk that we might lose our privilege 
to speak. Whilst we are of the opinion that many academic presentations would benefit 
from a dose of straight-talking, the abrasive nature of the parrhesiastes’ intervention is 
not altogether consistent with the image of a community of scholars, to which we 
remain attracted. 
If there are limited opportunities to practice parrhesia through our teaching and 
research, what is left? We have in mind activity that engages directly with the ‘enemy’. 
That might be the senior management of the largest or most influential corporations in 
our localities. It might be civil servants with the responsibility for policy analysis in our 
areas of interest. It might be the politicians who drive such initiatives. It might be our 
own heads of faculties, or vice-chancellors. It might be our colleagues from the 
‘mainstream’ of management within business schools. 
In our experience of academic life, these opportunities present themselves even if we do 
not actively go in search of them. For example, when an invitation to address a 
breakfast meeting of managers arrives in our email inbox, it is tempting to delete it. 
Why would I want to spend my precious time talking to these people? They probably 
won’t understand what I have to say, and even if they do, what will they care? If I 
accept, that gives me less time for writing that academic paper, so what incentive is 
there for me to say yes? It is seemingly mundane engagements such as this that present 
opportunities for provocative dialogue. We should not delude ourselves that our 
interventions will convert these people to our ‘truth’, but it might be possible to “lead 
the interlocutor to internalize this parrhesiastic struggle – to fight within himself against 
his own faults” (Foucault, 2001: 133).  
We are not the first to have turned to parrhesia to intervene in the debate about the 
practical politics of CMS (Barratt, 2003; Barratt, 2004). The most comprehensive 
treatment is provided by Jack (2004), who juxtaposes the ideas of free speech and 
fearless speech. Jack asks whether critical management scholars are prepared to engage 
in fearless speech and concludes they are probably not, because of the potential negative 
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__________ 
material consequences. Whilst we might all stand for the principle of fearless speech, 
“its material enactment is something of a bigger challenge” (2004: 132). 
A more conservative reading is offered by Barrett (2008), who believes that the familiar 
narrative of CMS’ unfulfilled potential of political activism or practical criticism, which 
we re-tell in this paper, is somewhat ignorant of the constraining effects of the power 
relations through which CMS is constituted. Barrett appears swayed by commentary on 
the positioning of CMS within business schools which sees CMS as marginal and 
always under threat. On this hostile landscape, the acts of naming CMS, organizing 
conferences and launching journals devoted to critical work are themselves political 
acts. Barrett (ibid.: 532) concludes that “tactical images of manoeuvres on inhospitable 
terrain” better describes the contemporary location of CMS than the straight-talking and 
risk-taking critic. Here, we have a reaffirmation of the boundary between the university 
and the people which Kant constructs, with critical scholars playing their part “by 
furnishing sympathetic political actors with instruments of analysis for a possible 
struggle” (ibid.: 533). 
We are in agreement with Barrett that carving out a space for CMS within business 
schools where mainstream discourses of management and organization are hegemonic 
is not an easy task. We are fortunate to be located in a business school in which CMS 
represents more than a marginal endeavour, but accept that in many business schools, 
the bridgehead which critical management scholars have gained remains tenuous. 
However, as relative newcomers to CMS, we get the feeling that in some contexts at 
least, the life of the critical management scholar within the institution has become a 
relatively comfortable one.  
Much critical management scholarship offers a penetrating critique of capitalism from 
within an institution, the business school, which, we are told, “extorts fees from the 
middle and upper classes so it can stamp their offspring with a passport into corporate 
sleaze” (O’Doherty and Jones, 2005: 1). For people unfamiliar with the world of 
business schools, this might seem an untenable position, yet to us it seems not only 
possible, but quite common. One explanation for this is that the critique offered by 
CMS is relatively tightly contained within the community of scholars. The exploiters 
and the exploited in our capitalist societies pay little or no attention to the writings of 
critical management scholars, either because they are not aware that they exist (being 
largely confined to academic journals which are difficult and costly to access) or do not 
understand them (being written in a language that they do not comprehend). As a result, 
the writings of critical management scholars are unlikely to give business school deans 
and university vice-chancellors sleepless nights because they can rest safe in the 
knowledge that such knowledge is highly unlikely to seep through the cracks of the 
ivory tower.4 It is, of course, unfair to lay the blame for this state of affairs solely at the 
feet of critical management scholars. There are strong pressures from the state, which 
are fed through to university administrators, to communicate with other scholars rather 
than the people and as Parker (2002: 129) notes, “writing unread scholarship counts, 
4 In making this criticism, we do not pretend to be immune from it. In a very act of writing this paper, 
we are spending time to communicate with primarily an academic audience – time which could 
otherwise be spent with engaging with corporate elites, policymakers, activists etc.  
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__________ 
organizing activism does not”.5 As new outlets for CMS research emerge and as CMS 
research finds its way increasingly into ‘mainstream’ journals, critical scholars become 
greater assets to the schools which employ them. It is almost as if the content of their 
critique becomes irrelevant. 
Those solely concerned with CMS achieving academic credibility within universities 
might not see the low level of public engagement as a problem. As we have shown 
earlier, influential figures within CMS do see it as a problem. The common response is 
that CMS, as a collective, must do more to reach out to the people.6 We feel however, 
that these increasing calls for a politically-engaged CMS might be well-intentioned but 
misdirected. Rather than looking to the ‘community’ to co-ordinate the action, we have 
argued that it might be better if we look more at ourselves, considering our own sense 
of responsibility and duty and figuring out where and how we can intervene to make a 
difference. 
The critical management scholar as parrhesiastes might be idealistic, but idealism is 
about ideas and about setting challenging goals, neither of which we consider to be 
negatives. We concur with Jack (2004) that there is still value in using parrhesia as a 
principle that might guide action, however pragmatic and limited it might be. Of course, 
there are many reasons for shying away from fearless speech. There would seem to be 
few institutional rewards on offer and sharing our critiques with those outside the 
university carries risks. When we attempt to communicate our ideas for consumption by 
the public, there is a risk that we appear simplistic or sensational, causing colleagues to 
accuse us of undermining our discipline. In a university environment where autocratic 
management styles are replacing more collegial approaches and where universities are 
becoming increasingly sensitive about how they are perceived by stakeholders, there is 
also the risk that we get offside with our employers. 
Conclusion: A Problem of Critical Management Studies 
Kant answers the question of ‘What is enlightenment?’ using the motto ‘Sapere Aude’ 
or ‘Dare to know! In this paper we have dared to question Kant’s articulation of 
critique. We have interrogated Kant’s distinction between the public and the people in 
Conflict of the Faculties, being sympathetic to this isolationism given the threats of the 
censors and his desire to create a space for the expression of freedom yet raising 
concern at some of its consequences for the present. For an exemplar of fearless speech, 
we need look no further than Kant himself. There are similarities between Kant’s letter 
to his King and parrhesia as enacted in not only speaking the truth, but asking to be 
allowed to speak the truth. 
5 One of us must admit to feelings of disappointment that ephemera does not appear on the list of 
Australian Research Council rankings of journals, which has been adopted by our university as a 
mechanism for measuring research performance and which led to the realization that this publication 
would not ‘count’ as evidence that we are fulfilling our responsibilities for furthering knowledge. 
6 This was an agenda item at the 2008 business meeting for the CMS Interest Group at the Academy of 
Management. Out of 900 members, only approximated 50 were at the meeting. 
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Trying to place the Kynics on Kant’s schema of the university and the process of 
critique and progress is difficult. Diogenes seems to have forsaken all of the benefits of 
a private life, living as he did in a barrel, for a perpetual position in the public. But his 
method of discoursing with the public was not the learned books, but a biting rhetoric. 
For Kant there was the reading public who were interested in these esoteric arguments, 
and the people who would find these discussions boring or unsettling. The faculties and 
public forums were tools for ensuring that individuals lived in a system in which they 
would be happy to obey, or simply did not have to think about whether obedience was 
good. In Kant’s schema it seems that the Kynics eschewed the private and the public in 
favour of direct dialogue with the people. To Kant the Kynics seem to be inviting 
anarchy and rebellion against the government. 
In this paper, we have used Foucault’s analysis of parrhesia and its expression by the 
Kynics as a mirror to cast a reflective light on CMS. Although Foucault does not 
advocate parrhesia as an intellectual practice, it might usefully contribute to rethinking 
the challenges facing CMS, by encouraging us to view critique more as a personal ethic 
than as something located within institutions such as CMS or the modern university. If 
we are to take the concerns about the future of CMS at face value, then there seems a 
genuine desire to invigorate critique. The development of CMS has been largely driven, 
until now, by a desire to be regarded as a legitimate perspective on organization studies, 
within business schools which have themselves been preoccupied with a quest for 
academic legitimacy within universities. With that institutional location now relatively 
strong, at least in the UK, Europe and Australasia, there is now a desire to connect 
better with those outside the university and this is assumed to be the next stage in CMS’ 
development. This argument has intuitive appeal, but we are not convinced. We started 
out with the idea that CMS has a problem – its lack of engagement in the politics of the 
workplace. While we share that concern, our conclusion is that CMS, as an institution 
within the business school, is a problem. With every effort that goes into strengthening 
the position of CMS within university business schools, CMS becomes more 
professionalized and increasingly isolated from life outside the institution.  
The juxtaposition of parrhesia with critical management scholars shows the limits of 
institutionalized critique. Freedom of speech, as represented by ‘academic freedom’ is 
granted by the institution of the university, subject to certain constraints. Fearless 
speech, on the other hand, encourages us to reflect on our engagement of critique at an 
intensely personal level. It is, we suggest, fundamentally about the personal rather than 
the institutional. It is analogous to walking the tightrope without the safety net below. 
Those in the modern university wanting to learn from the parrhesiastes need to consider 
the medium of transmission that the university provides, and, in line with Giroux 
(2003), find it necessary to defend these public spaces as one of the first acts that will 
allow free speaking to flourish. One requirement of securing public space may be to 
consider in more depth the particular relations to the public which may seem distasteful 
to some critical management scholars: perhaps public acceptance of the necessity for 
protection of public spaces in the university is of more importance than the strict styling 
of academic discourse. In short, some may need to pull their heads out of their arses, put 
aside their obsessions over language and start making sense as a political act. If we were 
more frank by writing with greater clarity, if we were more willing to speak directly to 
those in power and if we were willing to risk the privileges that come through our 
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membership of the university, we might come closer to fulfilling the emancipatory 
potential of CMS. 
While we have been preoccupied with critique as practised within universities, we 
would like to finish by pointing to alternative forms of ‘education’ in our broader 
communities, and in particular to those in our home city of Wellington, that go under 
the name ‘anarchists’, but more specifically to those fighting for animal rights, 
environmental protection, an end to institutionalised racism, direct representation in 
politics and for/against an array of associated causes. We would like to point to loosely 
affiliated groups who are able to analyse the basis of their own common membership 
without blushing, who work as many hours as many employed people, but do so as 
unpaid volunteers, and those who aim to establish non-corporate media. Those with 
traction, without contracts. 
 
Adler, P., L. Forbes and H. Willmott (2008) ‘Critical management studies’, The Academy of Management 
Annals, 1(1): 119-179. 
references 
Bauman, Z. (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Barratt, E. (2003) ‘Foucault, askesis and the practice of critique in management studies’, paper presented 
at the Third International Critical Management Studies Conference, July, Lancaster University, 
UK. 
Barratt, E. (2004) ‘Foucault and the politics of critical management studies’, Culture and Organization, 
10(3): 191-202. 
Barratt, E. (2008) ‘The later Foucault in organization and management studies’, Human Relations, 61(4): 
515-537. 
Boethius, A. (1999) The Consolation of Philosophy. London: Penguin. 
Branham, R.B. and M. Goulet-Cazé (1996) The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy. 
California: University of California Press. 
Böhm, S and S. Spoelstra (2004) ‘No critique’, ephemera, 4(2): 94-100. 
Bridgman, T. (2007) ‘Reconstituting relevance: exploring possibilities for management educators’ 
Critical Engagement with the Public’, Management Learning, 38(4): 425-439. 
Chan, A. and J. Garrick (2002) ‘Organization theory in turbulent times: the traces of Foucault’s ethics’, 
Organization, 9(4): 683-701. 
Critical Management Studies Division, Academy of Management (n.d.) ‘Domain Statement’, available at 
http://group.aomonline.org/cms/Domain.htm. [Accessed 22 October, 2008]. 
Derrida, J. (2004) ‘Mochlos, or the conflict of the faculties’, in Eyes of the University, trans. J. Plug. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 83-112. 
Derrida, J. (2002) ‘University without condition’, in Without Alibi, trans. P. Kamuf. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 202-237. 
Dey, P. and C. Steyaert (2007) ‘The troubadours of knowledge: passion and invention in management 
education’, Organization, 14(3): 437-461. 
Dunne, S., S. Harney and M. Parker (2008) ‘Speaking out: the responsibilities of management 
Intellectuals: a survey’, Organization, 15(2): 271-282. 
Education Act (1989) Wellington: Government Printer. 
Foucault, M. (2001) Fearless Speech, ed. J. Pearson. Boston: Semiotext(e). 
Foucault, M. (2007a) ‘What is critique?’, in S. Lotringer (ed.) The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e), 41-82. 
Foucault. M. (2007b) ‘What is enlightenment?’, in S. Lotringer (ed.) The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, 
CA: Semiotext(e), 97-120. 
      269
© 2008 ephemera 8(3): 258-270 Institutionalizing Critique  
articles Todd Bridgman and Murdoch Stephens 
      270
Giroux, H. (2003) Public Spaces, Private Lives: Democracy beyond 9/11. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
Grey, C. (2004) ‘Reinventing business schools: the contribution of critical management education’, 
Academy of Management Learning and Education, 3(2): 178-186. 
Grey, C. and A. Sinclair (2006) ‘Writing differently’, Organization, 13(3): 443-453. 
Jacoby, R. (1987) The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Jack, G. (2004) ‘On speech, critique and protection’, ephemera, 4(2): 121-134. 
Kant, I. (2007) ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’, in S. Lotringer (ed.) The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e), 29-37. 
Kant, I. (1992) The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. M. Gregor. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Mir, R. and A. Mir (2002) ‘The organizational imagination: from paradigm wars to praxis’, 
Organizational Research Methods, 5(1): 105-125. 
Moten, F. and S. Harney (2004) ‘The university and the undercommons’, Social Text, 22(2): 101-115. 
O’Doherty, D and C. Jones (2005) ‘Inducement’, in C. Jones and D. O’Doherty (eds.) Manifestos for the 
Business School of Tomorrow. Åbo: Dvalin Books. 
Parker, M. (2002) Against Management. Cambridge: Polity. 
Posner, R. (2001) Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Readings, B. (1996) The University in Ruins. Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press. 
Sloterdijk, P. (1987) Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. M. Eldrid. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Starkey, K. and A. Hatchuel (2002) ‘The long detour: Foucault’s history of desire and pleasure’, 
Organization, 9(4): 641-656. 
Tasker, M. and D. Packham (1990) ‘Freedom, funding and the future of the universities’, Studies in 
Higher Education, 15(2): 181-195. 
Wray-Bliss, E. (2004) ‘A right to respond? Monopolisation of ‘voice’ in CMS’, ephemera, 4(2): 101-120. 
Wray-Bliss, E. (2007) ‘Ethics at work’, in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.) Introducing Organizational 
Behaviour and Management. London: Thomson Learning, 506-533. 
 
Todd Bridgman is a senior lecturer in organizational behaviour at Victoria University of Wellington, New 
Zealand. He http://www.criticialmanagement.org/is a former journalist and is interested in exploring 
relationships between the university, media, politics and society. 
the authors 
Email: todd.bridgman@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Murdoch Stephens is a research assistant at Victoria University of Wellington. He is interested in 
animality, askesis, humanism, pedagogy, and the past, present, and future of co-operative organization. 
He is currently cobbling together a PhD application with no topic or destitution in mind. 
Email: murdoch.stephens@vuw.ac.nz 
